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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DALLAS B. JOHNSON and
JESSIE W. JOHNSON, his wife,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
12072

R.H. SESSIONS and HAZEL JUNE
DEAN' Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
In August of 1969, plaintiffs Dallas B. Johnson
and Jessie B. Johnson, his wife, initiated an action in
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County
to quiet title to a strip of land located between their
property and the property of defendant R. H. Sessions.
Plaintiffs also prayed in their complaint for an order
1
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requiring the defendant to remove certain improvements
which he had erected on the strip of land and for damages as a result of defendanfs past use of the property.
In December of 1969 the court granted plaintiffs' motion and added as a party defendant Hazel June Dean,
who also has some interest in the property of defendant
R. H. Sessions.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On March 25, 1970, the case was tried to the court,
sitting without a jury. Testimony and documentary evidence were presented, the matter was argued and submitted, and the court thereupon entered its Memorandum Decision on March 26, 1970. The decision was in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. Contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 52 (a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, no findings of fact and
conclusions of law have yet been entered. However,
inasmuch as the Memorandum Decision ref used to
plaintiffs the relief requested in their complaint, they
have taken this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek relief from the effect of the decision
of the trial court. The Memorandum Decision is inconsistent with the facts presented in the course of the trial
and the applicable law pertaining thereto. Plaintiffs ask
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that the decision be reversed and that a judgment be
entered granting to them the relief requested in their
complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs purchased the property on which they
reside in December of 1961 ( T-2) . They have been in
possession of the property continuously since that time
and they have regularly paid the taxes on the property
(T-4). The deeds by which plaintiffs acquired their
property and the abstract of title which they received at
the time of the purchase covered all of Lot 42, Block 2,
Hillcrest Subdivision (Exhibits 1-P, 2-P, and 3-P).
In June of 1969 plaintiffs hired the firm of Coon,
King and Knowlton to make a survey of their property.
The survey was completed under the personal direction
of Hooper Knowlton, Jr., a consulting engineer and
land surveyor (T-18) and a drawing (Exhibit 5-D)
was thereafter prepared of the property. The survey
revealed that the defendants' garage, driveway, and
garden (at the rear of the property) all encroach on
property properly contained in Lot 42, all of which
property was purchased by the plaintiffs (T-5, 19, 20,
21) . The width of the encroachment varies from about
81;2 inches to 21h feet (T-20, 21) and has an average
width, over the length of plaintiffs' property, of approximately 2 feet (T-5, 21).
The record is silent on when defendants' garage
and driveway were constructed. However, defendant
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R.H. Sessions testified that in 1948 a fence was erected
separating the two adjoining pieces of property ( T-25).
He was not asked and did not say whether the fence
erected at that time was in the same place as the present
fence and retaining walls.
In 1962 and 1963, plaintiffs constructed concrete
retaining walls along the then existing fence line in the
front and back of defendants' garage (T-8, 27). Defendant Session agreed to the erection of the retaining
walls and apparently allowed plaintiffs to come on his
property in connection with the construction (T-7, 8,
2.6).
Defendant R. H. Sessions testified to a conversation with Ira Coult in 1948 concerning the fence to be
erected ( T-25, 26). However, the testimony of Sessions
did not indicate where the fence was to be erected,
whether the parties knew the location of the true boundary line or whether Mr. Coult had such an interest in
the property that he could properly agree to anything
concerning it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS,
THROUGH A SERIES OF CASES, DEFINED
THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF A
"BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE."
DEFENDANTS' PROOF WAS NOT SUFFICl4
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ENT UNDER THESE WELL-ESTABLISHED
REQUIREMENTS AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUCH A
BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE
HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED.
Plaintiffs' proof clearly showed that they are the
record owners of all of Lot 42, including a strip approximately two feet in width which is presently being occupied by the defendants. The burden then shifted to
defendants to somehow justify their occupancy of plaintiffs' property. The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, concluded that the fence line has been established
as the boundary between the adjoining pieces of property "by long acquiescence," apparently basing its decision on the legal theory of "boundary line by acquiescence. "
The Honorable Court has, in a number of cases,
considered the requirements for establishing that the
boundary between adjoining pieces of property is in a
location other than where the property descriptions contained in the pertinent recorded documents pertaining
to the two pieces of property would place it. The following must be established:
I. That at one time there was uncertainty or a
dispute between the landowners concerning the
true location of a boundary line;

2. This uncertainty must have been resolved
by a mutual agreement recognizing some visible
marker or line as the boundary; and

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3. The agreement and the new boundary estab-

lished thereby must then be mutually acquiesced
in for a considerable period of time thereafter.

[Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R.
1417 ( 1928) and cases cited therein. J
These requirements have been further refined and
discussed in a series of decisions, including some that are
particularly pertinent to the instant case. In the case of
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949),
the court held that
. . . there must be some uncertainty or a dispute
between the adjoining owners as to the location
of the true boundary line before a fence which
they subsequently erect to resolve their differences and in which they acquiesce for a long
period of time, may be taken as the agreed
boundary line.
The court stated that being ignorant about the line is
not equivalent to uncertainty and then went on to say
that,
The mere fact that a fence happens to be put
up and neither party does anything about it for
a long period of time, will not establish it as the
true boundary.
The record in this case is totally devoid of proof
relating to any uncertainty ever having existed as to the
location of the true boundary line. As indicated in the
Statement of Facts, the only thing that was testified to
by defendant Sessions was that a fence was erected between the two pieces of property in 1948. He did not say
whether or not that fence was erected in the same place
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as the presently existing fence and retaining walls. He
was not asked and he did not say whether the location
of the true boundary line was known or unknown at that
time. Thus, there was no showing by the defendants that
any uncertainty or dispute ever existed with reference to
the true location of the boundary line.
The second requirement of a "boundary line by
acquiescence" is that the uncertainty or dispute must be
resolved by an agreement, presumably between the adjoining landowners, recognizing some visible line as the
boundary. Here again, defendants' proof was lacking
on this essential requirement. Defendant Sessions referred ( T-25, 26) to a conversation and an agreement
with someone named Ira Coult, who was then occupying
the property now owned by plaintiffs. In view of the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-24-2 ( 3) ( 1953),
there is considerable question about whether the trial
court should have allowed this particular testimony to
stand. However, even if it was properly allowed, it is
still not helpful since there is no designation of where the
fence was to be and what relationship, if any, such fence
had to the presently existing fence and retaining walls.
Even if the testimony of defendant Sessions concerning the conversation which he allegedly had with
Ira Coult had been specific as to where the fence was to
be erected, plaintiffs submit that their rebuttal evidence
clearly showed that Ira Coult had no authority to make
any kind of a binding agreement with regard to the
property now owned by plaintiffs.
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Mary Sears Coult Endsley was called as a witness
and she testified that in 1948, when defendant Sessions
allegedly had the conversation just referred to with Ira
Coult, Mr. Coult was living there as a "renter" (T-34).
She stated further that the property had previously belonged to Joe Coult, Sr. When he died in 1938, five
children survived him ( T-34) . If, as the testimony of
Mrs. Endsley suggests, Joe Coult, Sr. left no will, each
of the five surviving children succeeded to an equal, undivided interest in the property [Utah Code Anrwtated
74-4-5(2) (1953) ].
Thus, in 1948, at the time of the alleged conversation and agreement between Ira Coult and defendant
Sessions, Ira Coult had only an undivided one-fifth interest in the property. He was also the tenant of the persons owning the balance of the interest in the property.
Unless he is specifically empowered to do so by the other
owners, one of a number of tenants in common cannot
make any kind of a binding agreement respecting the
commonly owned property. Particularly is this true
where the effect of the alleged agreement would be to
give away a significant portion of the total property (on
T-5 plaintiff testified that the strip in question constituted approximately one-twentieth of his total property.
This testimony was not contradicted and was confirmed
by Mr. Knowlton, the surveyor, on T-19, 20, 21).
As indicated above, the defendants had the burden
of proving the establishment of a "boundary line by
acquiescence." They failed to prove the first two re-
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quirements established by this Honorable Court and
plaintiffs submit that they also failed to establish the
third requirement-long mutual acquiescence and recognition of a specific, visible marker or line as the boundary.
The first time, chronologically, that the record
clearly speaks of some visible marker in the same location as the presently existing fence and retaining walls
is in 1962. It was in that year that the plaintiffs constructed at the front and rear of their property retaining
walls, which retaining walls still stand. Defendant Sessions did not say where the fence allegedly discussed
with Ira Coult in 1948 was to be erected or where or
when it was finally erected. Between 1948 and 1962 the
location of the fence could have been changed any number of times. Thus, the only evidence in the record as to
the length of time that a visible marker has existed along
the line that defendants now seek to have declared the
boundary is that presented by plaintiff, and it goes back
only to 1962.
In the case of King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378
P.2d 893 ( 1963), the opinion of the Court contained an
analysis which was clearly marked "dictum." This analysis concluded that twenty years was the proper period to
be used as a "yardstick" in these cases. All of the justices
concurred with the opinion of the court and it thus appears that there was general agreement with the appropriateness of this particular guideline.
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The record in the instant case does not establish the
existence of "a visible marker or line" in the location that
defendants have attempted to establish as the boundary
line earlier than 1962. This eight-year period is less than
half of the period referred to in the King v. Fronk de·
cision as the "yardstick."
The Utah decisions have recognized that under
certain circumstances a rebuttable presumption of a
boundary line by acquiescence arises. If the party seek·
ing to establish a boundary line by acquiescence intro- ,
duces competent evidence on each of the elements, the
burden then shifts to the other party to overcome the
presumption. However,
... if the party claiming title by acquiescence
fails to carry his burden and raise the presump·
tion, then there is no case at all. [Fuoco v. Wil·
liams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1964), 18
Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966) ].
Here the defendants did not introduce competent
evidence on any of the required elements of a boundary
line by acquiescence. In addition, plaintiffs, in their
rebuttal evidence, further negated defendants' case by
showing that Ira Court had no authority to enter into '
any agreement respecting the boundary line.
One other very recent decision of this Court should
be noted. In the case of Carter v. Lindner, 23 Utah 2d
204, 460 P.2d 830 (1969), the Court held that where
one property owner gave an adjoining property owner
permission to build a fence in a particular location and
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where there was no uncertainty as to the true location
of the boundary at the time of the giving of permission,
no boundary line by acquiescence could be established.
vVithout a dispute and uncertainty as to the
true location of the boundary line there can be
no boundary line by acquiescence under an oral
agreement between adjoining property owners.
Thus, even if in 1948 Ira Coult did validly give permission for defendant Sessions to build his fence on
the line in question, he may have done so knowing
where the true boundary was and, under these circumstances, there would only have been created a temporary
right to use the property and not a boundary line by
acquiescence. When defendants failed to affirmatively
show that uncertainty existed as to the true boundary
in 1948, they failed to establish an essential element
of their case.
Plaintiffs clearly established their legal, record
ownership of the disputed strip of land. Defendants
then had the burden of establishing a right to the land
under the equitable theory of boundary line by acquiescence. However, they failed to prove a single one
of the essential elements of this equitable theory. They
thus failed to meet their burden of proof.
POINT II

THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF "ESTOPPEL" HAS, IN THE AREA OF BOUNDARY
DISPUTES, BEEN FORMALIZED AND IS
11
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THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPT OF "BOUND.
ARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE". PLAINTIFFS' CONDUCT WAS NOT SUCH THAT
THEY SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM AS.
SERTING THEIR LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.
In its Memorandum Decision the trial court held
that the new boundary line had been established by
"long acquiescence" and that "plaintiffs should be estopped from now asserting that the line, as established
by the fence, is not the correct and proper boundary
line, in view of their own conduct." The lower court
thus sought to base its decision on both the theory of
boundary line by acquiescence and on the principle of
estoppel.
In 12 Am. Jur. 2d "Boundaries" §89 is found a
discussion of the application of the principle of estoppel
to boundary line problems. The recognition by courts
of equity of a boundary line in a location other than
where the properly recorded documents would place it
is an application of the principle of estoppel, and such
recognition occurs where it would be "inequitable" for
parties to attempt to insist on the "true line" as the
proper boundary.
Utah, along with other states, has formalized the
doctrine of estoppel as applied to boundary disputes
and has developed specific guidelines concerning when
the doctrine should be applied. These guidelines ar.e
identified under the heading "boundary line by acqm·
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1

escence". This concept is an application of the doctrine
of estoppel and constitutes the single manner in which
the doctrine of estoppel is to be applied to boundary
line disputes. Plaintiffs submit that, with regard to
boundary line questions, the doctrine of estoppel has
not been given recognition by this Court other than
through the principle of "boundary line by acquiescence". Thus, estoppel cannot constitute a separate
ground upon which to base the trial court's decision.
Unless all of the requisites of "boundary line by acquiescence" are present, the doctrine of "estoppel" has no
application in these cases.
However, even if the doctrine of estoppel is entitled to separate recognition, the conduct of plaintiffs was not such as to estop them from claiming the
full extent of the land they purchased. In 12 Am. Jur.
2d "Boundaries" §89 is the following language regarding estoppel.
It is essential to the doctrine of equitable
estoppel generally that the party sought to be
estopped should have had knowledge of the facts,
or at least that he should have had the means at
hand of knowing all the facts or have been in
such a position that he ought to have known them;
this rule applies with particular force where the
case involves title to land or a dispute as to a
boundary and there was no negligence of the
party sought to be estopped in failing to assert
his right.

In the instant case the plaintiffs purchased their prop-

erty in December of 1961. They did not know that the
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defendants were using and claiming a portion of theh
property until June of 1969, when they paid to have
a survey prepared. Within three months of the date
of the discovery of the encroachment, the present action '
was initiated.
Plaintiffs had no way of knowing that defendants ·
were using their property until the completion of the
survey. As soon as they discovered the encroachment ·
they took prompt and proper action to enforce their
legal rights. As the above quotation from Am. Jur. ,
indicates, estoppel is properly applied only where a
party knows the necessary facts and then fails to do
anything for an unreasonable length of time.
Plaintiffs' conduct was entirely reasonable under
the circumstances and estopping them from recoving
the property which they purchased would be inappro·
priate and inequitable.

1

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs clearly established their legal title to '
the strip of property in question. Defendants then failed
to introduce competent evidence on any of the essential
requirements of a "boundary line by acquiescence".
Also, in view of the facts of the case, a decision in favor
of defendants on the theory of "estoppel" cannot be
justified. The trial court thus erred in deciding the issues
in favor of defendants and against the plaintiffs.
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Plaintiffs pray for reversal of the decision of the
trial court and for a decision granting to them the relief
improperly refused them by the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,

PUGSLEY, HAYES, WATKISS,
CAMPBELL & COWLEY
Attorneys for Appellant
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